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Psychological studies of relationships tend to focus on specific types of close personal
relationships (romantic, parent–offspring, friendship) and examine characteristics of
both the individuals and the dyad. This paper looks more broadly at the wider
range of relationships that constitute an individual’s personal social world. Recent
work on the composition of personal social networks suggests that they consist of
a series of layers that differ in the quality and quantity of relationships involved. Each
layer increases relationship numbers by an approximate multiple of 3 (5–15-50–150)
but decreasing levels of intimacy (strong, medium, and weak ties) and frequency of
interaction. To account for these regularities, we draw on both social and evolutionary
psychology to argue that relationships at different layers serve different functions and
have different cost-benefit profiles. At each layer, the benefits are asymptotic but the
costs of maintaining a relationship at that level (most obviously, the time that has to
be invested in servicing it) are roughly linear with the number of relationships. The
trade-off between costs and benefits at a given level, and across the different types of
demands and resources typical of different levels, gives rise to a distribution of social
effort that generates and maintains a hierarchy of layered sets of relationships within
social networks. We suggest that, psychologically, these trade-offs are related to the
level of trust in a relationship, and that this is itself a function of the time invested in the
relationship.
Social relationships are studied in numerous fields of basic and applied psychology.
Within social psychology, relationships are a fundamental component in models of
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social exchange (Kelley et al., 2003; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Rusbult & Van Lange,
2003) and affiliation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), as well as in theories of the relational
self (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Within health psychology and the literature on subjective well-being, relationships are
both a source of social support (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Golden, Conroy, & Lawlor, 2009;
Seeman, Lusignolo, Albert, & Berkman, 2001) and a determinant of quality of life (Cohen,
2004; Helgeson, 2003). In studies of internet use, the transformative impact of digital
technology on relationship maintenance (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Kraut et al.,
2002; Pollett, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2011) and relationship formation (Mesch & Talmud,
2007; Morahan-Martin & Schumacher, 2003) are hotly debated. This list could easily be
expanded.
Across these diverse literatures,most studies focus either on intra-individual processes
such as social perception and the self or on the properties of dyads,without locating these
processes within a broader social context. In this paper, we step back and take a wider
view, drawing on theory from evolutionary psychology that connects the individual
level to the broader ecology of groups and networks in which social interaction unfolds.
We also propose a model that integrates the evolutionary viewpoint with cognitive
mechanisms of trust that might account for observed, existing social structures, while
being grounded in a parsimonious set of behavioural predispositions produced by natural
selection. While evolutionary psychology is best known for emphasizing the fitness
benefits of relationships (e.g., Brown & Brown, 2006), it has also introduced the idea that
the costs and benefits of social interactions are a critical driver for cognitive evolution.
In this paper, we integrate an evolutionary perspective with a psychological per-
spective to account for some intriguing regularities that recent work has documented in
the layered structure of personal social networks. We hope to spark interest among the
many psychologists who study relationships to help explainwhy it is that social networks
appear to consist of a set of distinct layers of relationships that differ in both quantity and
quality. We believe this project fits with Bersheid’s (1994) plea for more interdisciplinary
work to help integrate research on different kinds of relationships. We first identify the
phenomenon to be explained: both egocentric social networks and social groups appear
to be structured in hierarchically organized layers that scale consistently in characteristic
sizes. Second, we offer a principled explanation for how and why such tiering of social
relationships might be expected to occur. In doing so, we build on and extend Brown
& Brown’s (2006) evolutionarily motivated analysis of close relationships. Finally, we
relate this tiering to the role of trust in the maintenance of dyadic social relationships.
Relationships, group size, and the structure of social networks
We begin this section with a brief summary of primate sociality, since it provides
the crucial context for an evolutionary perspective on human sociality. Primates in
general (and humans in particular) live in social groups that have long-term stability
and coherence, even where (as in chimpanzees and humans) these groups are spatially
dispersed. Such groups are an emergent property of individual dyadic relationships
(Dunbar & Shultz, 2010). For any given population, group size (the functional outcome
of sociality) appears to be optimized by balancing the benefits against the costs of group
living. For primates as with most mammals, the primary evolutionary driver providing
the benefits of group living has been predation risk (Shultz, Noe, McGraw, & Dunbar,
2004; van Schaik, 1983), even though other secondary benefits (e.g., territory defence,
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alloparenting) may have arisen as secondary benefits once group living was in place
(Dunbar, 1988); the costs are reflected in the negative effects of ecological and social
competition, all of which are likely to be group-size dependent. For any given species,
the typical balance between costs and benefits defines an average group size that sets
the norm for that species.
Primate social groups are, in effect, implicit social contracts in which individuals
cooperate to share the long-term costs of minimizing predation risk, while incurring
short-term costs in respect of immediate personal interests (Dunbar, 2008). Since
maintaining coherent groups is cognitively demanding, brain size (or more specifically
neocortex volume) will evolve to match the cognitive demands of the species’ optimal
group size. This claim forms the core of what has become known as the social brain
hypothesis (SBH) (Dunbar, 1992, 1998a; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007; Shultz & Dunbar,
2007, 2010). Though widely discussed within biology and evolutionary anthropology
as a plausible explanation linking social and cognitive evolution, the SBH is relatively
unknownwithin psychology, despite its profound implications for a wide range of social
relationships
The formation of cohesive social groups of the kind found in primates inevitably
creates costs because individuals are forced to forage and rest in close proximity, and
are unable to diffuse within-group aggression easily by distancing themselves from those
withwhom they are in conflict. If these tensions are not adequately resolved, conflict will
split groups apart and the benefits of grouping will be lost. Primates buffer themselves
against these costs by forming small coalitions of two or three individuals that reduce the
frequency of aggression or harassment (Dunbar, 2010a). In sum, for primates, grouping
to reduce predation risk creates internal costs, which are in turn resolved by further
micro-scale groupings within the community as a whole. As a result, social groups
naturally consist of sets of lower level groupings nested within a larger grouping, with
some species effecting as many as four or five layers, much as we find in humans (Hill,
Bentley, & Dunbar, 2008; Zhou, Sornette, Hill, & Dunbar, 2005). Note that although
predation risk provides the principal explanation for the evolution of group size in
primates as a whole, this cannot be true for the handful of species (notably chimpanzees
and humans) that live in so-called fission–fusion social systems where the group (or
community) does not forage as a single unit. In these cases, the anti-predation function
is linked with the foraging group (one of the inner layers) and the main SBH-predicted
outer grouping layer has instead become associated with other functions that have yet
to be conclusively identified (possibilities include territory defence or access to mates).
Applied to humans, the primate SBH relationship predicts an average group (i.e., com-
munity) size of around 150, a value that has been documented in a wide range of social,
cultural, and historical circumstances, representing both top-down (community level)
and bottom-up (egocentric personal network) perspectives (Dunbar, 1993; Hamilton,
Milne, Walker, Burger, & Brown, 2007; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Roberts, Dunbar, Pollet,
& Kuppens, 2009; Zhou et al., 2005). Examples include community size in traditional
hunter–gatherers, average countywide village sizes in both the Domesday Book and
eighteenth century England, company size in historical and modern armies, and parish
sizes among the Amish and Huterites (Dunbar, 2008). This convergence between whole
group size and egocentric network size is striking, given that they are clearly not the same
thing. The fact that these two perspectives yield the same numbers is thus surprising,
and remains unexplained.
Viewed from the perspective of egocentric social networks, 150 represents the active
network of individuals that we know as persons and with whom we have reciprocated,
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the layering of relationships in social networks. EGO indicates the
individual whose personal network is being illustrated. The layers correspond to the hierarchically
inclusive number of other individuals (‘Alters’) who are members of Ego’s social network (after Roberts,
2010).
personalized relationships that have a history (we know how they fit into our social
world and they know how we fit into theirs). As is the case in primates as a whole,
this group of 150 is not homogenous in terms of the structure of relationships. Within
the network as a whole, there are a series of ‘circles of acquaintanceship’ that seem to
scale with a consistent ratio close to 3 (Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Zhou et al., 2005; see also
Hamilton et al., 2007). These layers (which are hierarchically inclusive) lie at around 5,
15, 50, and 150 individuals (shown schematically in Figure 1). This layering pattern holds
for both the bottom-up structure of egocentric networks and the top-down structure of
communities and their constituent subgroups (something that is especially clear, e.g., in
the structure of military units: Dunbar, 2010b).
In humans, the innermost two layers have been identified as the support clique of
4–5 and the sympathy group of 12–15 (Dunbar & Spoors, 1995; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007),
the latter being already familiar from social psychology (Buys & Larson, 1979). These are
followed by the affinity group (or band in the ethnographic literature) of around 50 and
the active network (clan in the ethnographic literature) of 150 individuals. For personal
networks, these layers have been shown to represent natural disjunctions in both the
level of intimacy between Ego and Alter1 (Figure 2) and the frequency with which they
interact (Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Roberts et al., 2009), although, as yet, we do not know
why social relationships should form these natural hierarchies or why the layers of an
egocentric network should scale the same way that hierarchically nested group sizes
scale.
This layering has implications for the patterning of relationships. Although close
friends of a given individual are more likely to be friends (a property known as clustering
or network transitivity), the probability that any two of my friends are also friends with
each other tends to fall between 10% and 50% (Girvan&Newman, 2002). So, the personal
social networks of friends who both belong to the same large group of 150 overlap at
best incompletely, even though each has an active network of about the same size.
1We use these terms as they are commonly used in the social network literature. Ego refers to the subject (or ‘owner’) of a
personal network and Alter refers to the individual members of Ego’s personal network.
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Figure 2. Mean (± SE) in emotional closeness (indexed on a 1–10 analogue scale) for Alters in
each layer of the network for 295 women sampled in United Kingdom and Belgium. Network layers
are defined by Alters ordered as 1–5, 6–15, 16–50, 51—150, and 151–500 by time to last contact.
Emotional closeness differs significantly across the layers (F4,18538 = 2002.4; p < .0001), with each layer
differing significantly from all the others (Scheffe´ tests: p < .001 in each case). Sample sizes (L to R):
4770, 5209, 1934, 3288, 3342 Alters. Source: Roberts et al. (2009).
Although the broader pattern has not attracted much attention, there is considerable
support in the literature for at least the two inner layers. Despite differences in the
way close and not-so-close relationships are defined (Fischer, 1982; Grossetti, 2005;
Milardo, 1992), studies of friendships and other human social relationships report
broadly comparable network sizes based on this distinction. Using an intimate (socially
close) versus routine (actively maintained) classification, Wellman, Carrington, and Hall
(1988) found a mean of 5.0 intimate ties and 12.5 active ties, and reported that intimate
relationships formed dense clusters, with active ties forming inter-cluster bridges. These
values are in close agreement with those obtained by Dunbar and Spoors (1995) who
used criteria based on both social support (advice and help at the personal level) and
frequency of contact (weekly vs. monthly). In contrast, a wider ranging survey that used
‘very close’ and ‘somewhat close’ ties as criteria reported means of 11.6 and 16.8 ties
for each level (Kayahara, Wellman, Boase, Hogan, & Kennedy, 2005).
Name-generation studies of relationships, which elicit stronger ties by using a number
of questions as cues give a fairly consistent mean network size of approximately
15 individuals (Fischer, 1982; Grossetti, 2007). Several studies on friendships have
distinguished different levels of relationship intimacy without focusing explicitly on
network structure. Hays (1989) compared close and casual friendships and found that
close friendships showed more interactions during the week, across a wider range
of days, times, and locations than casual friendships. In terms of benefits received,
close friends offered more emotional and informational support than casual ones.
Indeed, the most commonly used classification in these studies is best, close, and
casual friend (Oswald, Clark, & Kelly, 2004; Rose & Serafica, 1986). Oswald et al.
(2004) assessed friendship in terms of different dimensions of friendship maintenance
behaviours (positivity, supportiveness, openness, and interaction), and found a clear
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distinction between higher scoring best friends on the one hand and lower scoring
close and casual friends on the other. Rose and Serafica (1986) found that casual
friends required less emotional involvement than best or close friends, but were more
dependent on opportunities for contact. In contrast, best friendships were seen as being
self-maintained.
In sum, consistent behaviour differences have been reported for different levels
of relationship intensity. Friendships are usually seen as involving positive emotion,
intimacy, support, and interaction (Brown & Brown, 2006; Dainton, Zelley, & Langan,
2003), and these psychological aspects are more pronounced in stronger friendships
with best, close, and casual being a useful, although under-defined, classification. Studies
of human relationships, therefore, generally support the hypothesis that we maintain
different kinds of relationship, with a smaller number of intimate friendships. By and
large, the focus of the social psychological literature has been on close or intimate
relationships such as parent–offspring, romantic, and intimate friends relationships
(Berscheid, 1994; Kelley et al., 1983; see also Brown & Brown, 2006). However,
given that our individual social worlds seem to consist of hierarchically layered sets
of relationships, our task is to find a principled explanation for why such structures
might exist.
One plausible explanation for the layering of relationships in human personal social
networks is that the layers (i.e., the different relationship types) are designed to deal
with different kinds of functions and/or constraints. For practical convenience, we
restrict our remarks here to the two innermost layers (the 5 and 15) and the outermost
(the 150). In his ‘weak links’ hypothesis, Granovetter (1973, 1985) proposed that
information exchange is the function for the active egocentric network (in our schema,
synonymous with the 150 layer). However, alternative and perhaps ethnographically
more plausible possibilities are that larger networks serve functions of resource buffering
(controlling access to foraging areas or creating a network of trading relationships)
or community-level defence against neighbouring human groups (Alexander, 1974;
Dunbar, 1996). In contrast, the innermost network layers of 5 and 15 are most likely
to involve social support, which can be either mutual (friends) or directional (e.g.,
parent–offspring). They seem to represent the two levels of intimates on whom we
really depend (and/or who depend on us) for facilitating (in a psychological sense) our
pathway through the complex social world in which we live, with such relationships
being mediated by the emotional basis of close friendships in just the way suggested
by Brown & Brown (2006) in their SIT (‘selective investment theory’) hypothesis. In
terms of size, the sympathy group (typically 12–15 members) seems to correspond
proportionately to the coalitions found in monkeys and apes (Kudo & Dunbar, 2001),
and in humans this may represent the group of reliable friends on whom one can depend
for a variety of exchange relationships (e.g., friendship in the social sense, protection
against harassment, minimizing social stress, distributed childcare, etc.). In contrast, the
innermost layer of about 5, the support clique, seems to represent the set of closest
intimates, typically immediate family members and best friends, who are most likely to
provide a mutual environment for emotional and instrumental (e.g., financial) support.
A likely reason for this apparent partitioning of social relationships is that they pose
contrasting trade-offs between the benefits and costs of maintaining relationships of
different quality. In the following section, we discuss the constraints on the distribution
of a social time budget that might lead to a mix of relationship types of this kind. Our
account builds on the ideas developed by Brown & Brown (2006) in the SIT hypothesis,
but adds to this by setting it within a broader community-level perspective.
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Figure 3. Mean time spent interacting with individual Alters in each layer of the network. Source: as
for Figure 2.
Trade-offs and constraints
Primates bond their social groups through social grooming, and the time devoted to
grooming is a linear function of group size (Dunbar, 1991; Lehmann et al., 2007). If
humans were to bond their groups using the same mechanism, the time cost would be
exorbitant (Dunbar, 1993). Instead, humans seem to have made social interaction more
efficient by the acquisition of language to transform grooming into gossip (Dunbar, 1993;
1996). Nonetheless, because fitness is still driven by the basic need to feed and find food,
there will always be an upper bound on the amount of time that any species can afford
to devote to social interaction (Dunbar, 1993; Dunbar, Korstjens, & Lehmann, 2009).
Within the limits that this sets on the social time budget, each individual can choose to
distribute its social time equitably or not. But if there is a tendency to ‘favour the few’ and
distribute social time to form and maintain a small number of close relationships, then
why should not all social time be devoted to core close relationships to the exclusion of all
others? Clearly this is not the case, since nearly all studies of human friendship and social
relationships report at least two bands of intensity (strong vs. weak ties: Granovetter,
1973; 1985; close vs. casual relationships: Hays, 1989; Wellman & Wortley, 1990; core
vs. peripheral ties: McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2006). More importantly,
the data from our sample of∼300 complete personal social networks clearly demonstrate
that humans invest much more time and effort in some relationships (especially those
in the inner core of five intimates) than in others, with frequency of contact with Alters
declining as a steep negative exponential function of network layer (Figure 3).
A more plausible suggestion, then, is that a cost-benefit mechanism limits the value
of having an ever-increasing number of close ties in such a way as to naturally partition
social relationships into at least two kinds: those in whom one invests a great deal
of time and those with whom one spends less time, with knock-on consequences for
the quality of the relationships concerned. In this, we follow both Brown and Brown
(2006) in arguing that intimate relationships provide a level of emotional intensity that is
crucial in creating close friendships, thereby facilitating the formation of close support
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coalitions and our own finding that frequency of contact with an Alter is positively
correlated with self-rated emotional closeness to that individual (Hill & Dunbar, 2003;
Roberts et al., 2009). We extend Brown & Brown’s argument to differentiate between
two distinct types of close relationships, namely the inner core of five intimates (often,
but not necessarily, immediate family) and the next layer of around 10 close friends or
family members. We suggest that the distinction between intimates and close friends lies
in a balance in the distribution of costs and benefits with reference to their respective
functional outcomes. Intimates identify a set of individuals who provide (and/or require)
close emotional support that allows us to fine-tune emotional well-being and stress
reduction as well as enabling us to interface with the wider social world. In this respect,
they resemble the kinds of relationships identified in Fredrickson’s (2004) ‘broaden-and-
build’ model of positive emotions. In this model, relationships exist to nurture positive
emotions (which, as Fredrickson notes, have been largely ignored in psychology) that
in turn provide a social and psychological environment within which individuals can
not only survive better as individuals but also cooperate more effectively as functional
groups. Such relationships allow us to reduce stress by their reassuring presence and, at
least among adults, the promise of intervention in the conflicts by active support, as has
been documented in primates (Crockford, Wittig, Whitten, Seyfarth, & Cheney, 2008;
Dunbar, 2010a; Wittig et al., 2008). Among humans, there are similarly striking effects
of network membership on well-being: Fowler & Christakis (2008), for example, have
shown that the state of happiness of one’s close friends, and even friends-of-friends,
can prospectively influence one’s own happiness. In contrast, the layer of close friends
beyond this inner core of intimates provides a wider source of exchange at a personal
level (reciprocal exchange of material goods and/or time [in the sense of ‘helping out’],
childcare, social activity, mutual protection against harassment, etc.).
Even though large support groupswould seem to bemore effective than smaller ones,
leading to a selection pressure favouring ever larger coalitions, there must inevitably be
a trade-off between the benefits that accrue and the cost of maintaining the relationships
concerned. This is likely to be so for three reasons. First, only so many individuals may
be able to provide the benefit at any one time (a too-many-cooks-spoil-the-broth effect).
Research in the social psychology of group work confirms that benefits are asymptotic
for groups with tasks that require close coordination. Larger task groups commonly fail
to perform in proportion to their size (Steiner, 1972) for a number of reasons, including
free riding and loss of motivation (Kerr, 1983), as well as process losses (e.g., production
blocking in group brainstorming: Diehl & Stroebe, 1991). Second, close relationships
are usually reciprocal (Brown & Brown, 2006), so while each relationship accumulates
potential benefit to Ego, it does so at the cost of exposing Ego to the risk of being called
upon to reciprocate commitments to all of the Alters with whom such a relationship
has been built up. However, the real underlying basis of the trade-off is that, if the
quality of a relationship (and hence its reliability) is a function of the time invested
in it, there will be costs to creating and, in particular, maintaining relationships over
time. In contrast to the benefits (which are likely to be asymptotic), these costs increase
linearly with the number of relationships involved, since each relationship requires the
investment of an equal amount of time and effort. If each relationship requires aminimum
level of time commitment to maintain its quality (relationships decay over time if the
members do not interact: see Canary & Dainton, 2003; Hays, 1985; Roberts & Dunbar, in
press), every additional Alter means that an Ego’s social time requirement must increase
proportionately.
Relationships and the social brain 157
Cost
Benefit
or
Cost
Support clique
Optimal layer size
Sympathy group
Optimal layer size
Number of
Alters
Benefit A (emotional)
support)
Cost
Benefit B (alliances)
Figure 4. An optimality model of the trade-off between the (linear) time investment costs and the
(asymptotic) benefits that accrue for relationships of different quality. Optimal numbers of Alters for
a given relationship type are identified by the relevant Nash equilibrium (defined by the point where
the relevant cost line intersects with the relevant benefit line). We assume that costs rise more or
less linearly with the number of relationships that have to be maintained, and do so more steeply
for relationships that require more intense relationships (high- vs. low-costs lines), while the benefits
themselves are asymptotic (there is a limit to which adding more Alters will increase the benefit that
accrues to Ego, with high vs. low benefits representing functionally different qualities of benefit such as
emotional support vs. exchange of favours). The example considers only the two innermost network
layers (support clique and sympathy group), but a similar argument can be made for the two outer
layers of the network (affinity group and active network).
Ultimately, this process encounters a pair of insurmountable constraints: one is that
there are only so many hours available in the day, the second being the fact that time
is not elastic (i.e., compressible). The magnitude of this constraint is obvious from the
time costs involved. If we assume that the average interaction lasts 30 min (see Eagle,
Pentland, & Lazar, 2009) and sum across the numbers in each layer multiplied by the
contact rates given in Figure 3, the result is 2.25 h a day spent in social interaction, a figure
that is comfortably within the average of 3.5 h a day that diary and time budget studies
from a diverse sample of cultures indicates is actually spent in genuine social interaction
(i.e., including casual interactions) (Dunbar, 1998b). If however, if each relationship in
every layer required the same intensity of interaction as that lavished on support clique
members (as shown in Figure 3), the total required daily socializing budget would be an
impossible 39.4 h a day.
The issue, then, is what number of intimates optimizes net benefit by maximizing the
gain while minimizing the costs. The trade-off is between spreading oneself thinly to gain
many potential allies, and concentrating social timemore conservatively to build a higher
level of trust among a smaller number of allies. Social support and the risk trade-off might
thus explain the SBH observation that people tend to have a small number of very close
friends, a slightly larger number of good friends and a large number of acquaintances.
We can model this as a standard optimality problem (Figure 4). While there is a
common cost baseline (the unitary time cost of maintaining individual friendships), this
is modulated by how intense the process of relationship formation is. In other words,
really intense relationships require relatively more time investment, yielding a steeper
cost curve (contrast the high- vs. low-cost curves in Figure 4). Benefits also increase with
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the number of Alters offering a particular resource type, but, as is invariably the case with
benefit curves, reach an asymptote as a result of a satiation effect (in part a consequence
of the limitations on the marginal gains we discussed above). Some resource types (e.g.,
emotional support) have high fitness valency, and thus asymptote at an absolutely higher
level, but reach that asymptote earlier because they impose comparatively high demands;
in contrast, other resources (generalized exchange relationships for childcare and other
reciprocated benefits) rise to a lower asymptote more slowly because ‘too many cooks’
effects are less intrusive and/or a minimum pool of potential allies is needed to guarantee
the benefit (e.g., to find someone with the time to spare to help out). In each case, the
Nash equilibrium (which defines the optimal solution) is given by the intersection of the
respective cost and benefit lines. This yields two separate optimal group sizes, a smaller
number of more intensely rewarding and demanding relationships and a larger number
of less intense ones, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Although the outer layers at 50 (affinity group) and 150 (active network) are
not equally well understood, we can nonetheless conjecture something about the
functions of these layers. We know from our network data that these layers consist
disproportionately of extended family members (Roberts et al., 2009), who are bound
to Ego through obligate ties of kinship that have a significant impact on willingness to
act altruistically (Curry, Roberts, & Dunbar, under revision). One advantage of ties with
extended kin over non-kin is that such ties are structural and hence persist in the absence
of active maintenance (Roberts, 2010). While demands for assistance by or from kin are
harder to turn down, the social investment in these ties between episodes of support
may be minimal.
In ethnographic terms, the 50-layer for group size maps to the overnight camp (or
band) size in traditional small-scale human societies (Dunbar, 1993). This grouping level
provides a larger number of individuals for different activities divided between male
(hunter) and female (gatherer) roles, and might also be related to protection against
predators (as we noted above, the main driver for group size evolution among primates).
Both sexes tend to form relationships in age-related cohorts, so a 50-band may be a
consequence of coalescing three sympathy groups for overnight predator protection
(the period during which predation risk is much the highest for humans), with the
added benefit of information sharing as well as cooperative foraging. Beyond the typical
group size, however, increased coordination requirements are likely to lead to process
losses such that benefits again asymptote. Overnight camp groups depend on much
weaker ties (Figure 3) linking families or other clusters. As a result, these larger groups
are relatively unstable in hunter–gatherer societies, and tend to change membership on
a scale of months as individual families come and go due to diverging interests and/or
petty squabbles. In contemporary terms, we might envisage the 50-layer providing for a
wider range of willing exchange partners, but ones that are articulated on a more strictly
reciprocated basis (help is only given when repayment is reasonably certain).
The 150-level grouping (the community or clan in the ethnographic literature) may
be important for inter-group conflict in traditional societies, where larger groups are
especially important because sheer size matters. This layer is composed of individuals
who are socially familiar with most other members of the larger collective, with clusters
linked together in a ‘small world’ structure. The embedded layers of social relationships
supplemented by weak ties that connect all clusters (without connecting all individuals)
may provide sufficient cohesion for effective collective action in inter-community
conflict (leading to classic in-group/out-group effects). Furthermore, considering that
the younger male cohort in the group may only number one-eighth or so of the whole
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community, most males are likely to be defending their community with individuals
with whom they have reasonably intense (support, sympathy clique) relationships.
In traditional societies, this is often engineered by creating age cohorts who become
intensely bonded with each other during what are often deliberately frightening group
puberty rituals.
Another driver for forming weak ties in this outer layer may be information exchange
and access to resources. The more people an individual knows and socializes with, the
better that individual’s information flow (sensuGranovetter, 1973), and hence the better
their survival intelligence for finding food or avoiding local environmental problems. It
may also provide a pool of recruits with whom to formmore intense relationships should
the need arise (e.g., through death, broken friendships, etc.). Little social interaction time
is needed per individual for relationship maintenance at this level (Figure 3), but there
are many individuals to interact with. In contemporary post-industrial societies, this
information exchange function may now be the most important function of this outer
layer. Opportunities for mate choice might also be an important consideration at this
social level, as has been explicitly argued by Caporael and Baron (1997). Christakis and
Fowler (2010) note that around 75% of introductions to future life partners come through
the first three steps in the social network (i.e., the friends of friends of friends), which
is probably equivalent to the 150 layer of egocentric networks.
It is worth emphasizing here that the selection pressures driving the emergence of a
particular layer do not limit the functionality of that layer; rather, selection acts on the
psychological mechanisms that enable a group of a particular size to be realized (and so
have the desired functional outcome). In contemporary terms, this means that we have
natural cognitive propensities for groups of a particular size and relationship quality, not
for a particular function. Consequently, groupings represented by the different layers
can be used for any functional purpose for which relationships of a particular quality
or intensity defined by that layer are a design feature. In other words, work group sizes
are task specific. If a task requires intense relationships and deep social knowledge (i.e.,
understanding of individual members’ behavioural idiosyncrasies) between its members,
then there will be a limit on the size of work group that can handle that kind of
task efficiently to the innermost layer of five intimates. Conversely, tasks that require
larger numbers of individuals (e.g., brainstorming) may obviate the possibility of dealing
effectively with tasks that require more intimate personal knowledge. Within these
constraints, however, we can adapt our psychological mechanisms to deal with any task
that has the defining psychological design characteristics in a horses-for-courses fashion.
Trust in social relationships
The maintenance of coherent, long-lasting relationships seems likely to depend on at
least two key constraints: the time required to establish and maintain a relationship and
the cognitive demands of maintaining a functional mental database that can be used
to manipulate information about one’s social world (Dunbar, 2008). This emphasis on
constraints is in line with social interdependence theory (Kelley et al., 1983; Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959), which normally applies to non-kin. Investment in kin offers, of course,
a direct fitness benefit that requires no further explanation in terms of social benefits:
in evolutionary terms, altruism towards kin can be explained in terms of the theory of
kin selection (i.e., Ego gains in inclusive fitness by assisting relatives who share his/her
genes to reproduce more effectively: Hamilton, 1964). Although other constraints are
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doubtless operating as well, we emphasize these two core components because they
bridge into the non-human social world as well (Dunbar & Shultz, 2010).
Many of the relationships we have discussed involve reciprocation of commitment or
exchange relationships among non-kin that necessarily rely on trust – trust that (1) other
members of one’s network will cooperate or reciprocate when required to do so and
(2) none will deliberately undermine or abuse that relationship (Dunbar, 1998a). In this
section, we elaborate on a trust mechanism that gives us a psychological understanding
of why and how social time budgets might be distributed over types of relationship in
the way they seem to be.
Most definitions relate trust to reciprocity and collaboration (Deutsch, 1985; Ostrom,
2002; Rotter, 1971), whereby repeated interaction between two individuals generates
and affirms judgments that the other party is trustworthy. As defined by Rotter (1971),
trust is ‘an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or
written statement of another individual or group can be relied on’. Theories of human
friendship (Brown & Brown, 2006; Hays, 1985; Oswald et al., 2004) note the importance
of reciprocity and exchange of benevolent acts in building social relationships and,
implicitly, trust. Empirical studies of friendship (Hays, 1985, 1989; Oswald et al., 2004)
point to the advantage of investing in fewer, more intimate relationships. Furthermore,
the close correlation between interaction frequency and relationship intimacy (Hill &
Dunbar, 2003) supports the claim that trust formation for intimate relationships requires
considerable investment in social interaction (Roberts & Dunbar, in press).
Mutual trust supports mutual reliance on one another for help, emotional support and
companionship (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). McCabe (2002) argues that trust evolved to
enhance collaboration through improved abilities to assess trustworthiness and detect
deceit in social interactions. This depends on the human theory of mind capacity to
reflect on the social intentions of others. Communication increases cooperation and
trust in social dilemma games (Cook & Cooper, 2002; Ostrom, 2002) and, as more
evidence accrues through repeated interaction, trust may change from ‘calculativemode’
(in which an individual’s trustworthiness is assessed on limited evidence) to relational
trust through an emotional response based on direct social experience. Several authors
(Fesslet & Haley, 2003; Planalp, Fitness, & Fehr, 2006; Silk, 2003) have argued that the
role of emotion in friendship is to change detailed calculation of costs and benefits,
exemplified in tit-for-tat simulations of cooperation (Roberts & Renwick, 2003), into
bonds that are less susceptible to adverse interactions.
We propose that trust not only facilitates dyadic and group-level collaboration but also
underpins the formation and maintenance of social relationships. Trust may give rise to
distinct relationship layers via an affect component that reinforces attachment in close
relationships. If individuals socially ‘groom’ each other frequently over an extended
period of time, the level of mutual trust should increase to the stage where emotion
(i.e., pleasure in the Alter’s company) becomes more important than the rewards of
collaboration per se. This emotional engagement then provides the basis for future
commitmentwhenever thismight be needed, and the level of pleasure in Alter’s company
can serve as an index of howmuch they can be relied on. The degree of trust is therefore
closely related to emotional closeness; however, as a relationship becomes closer, affect
reduces the need to consciously calculate trust, and hence alleviates the cognitively
costly theory of mind burden (Powell, Lewis, Dunbar, Garc´ıa-Fin˜ana, & Roberts, 2010)
in tracking very close (support group) relationships. However, the influence of affect on
trust may be less appropriate for the sympathy clique relationships where formation of
alliances may necessitate a more conscious calculation of trust.
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Figure 5. Schematic outline of how trust develops over time, stabilizes out, and responds to challenges
for relationships corresponding to the three main network layers (strong, medium, and weak ties,
notionally corresponding to the 5, 15, and 150 layers, respectively). The model assumes that increasing
frequency of interaction results in increased levels of trust. However, although trust rises (perhaps
linearly) as a function of the frequency of interaction, there are a series of levels that trust naturally
stabilizes at (represented by the plateaux); trust can rise above these stable points only if significant
additional social effort is invested in the relationship. These stable points correspond to the different
kinds of relationships found in the various network layers. The X symbols indicate events that destabilize
relationships (insults, sins of omission or commission, etc.). Weak ties are relatively immune to such
insults due to their low trust level. However, medium ties are more sensitive, and exhibit an immediate
decline in trust following an insult, after which trust may rebuild. If too many insults occur together,
however, a medium tie might decline precipitously and become a weak tie. At the highest level of trust,
an affect buffer comes into play and buffers the tie against isolated negative events.
The interaction between trust and relationships is summarized in Figure 5, showing
three levels of trust formation, each respectively, corresponding to a different rela-
tionship layer. As a general rule, trust develops over time as dyads interact, settling at
a particular trust (i.e., relationship) level if interaction rates are not frequent enough
to lift them above the threshold required for a higher layer. Strong ties exhibit more
resilience to unfriendly interactions, giving intimate friends the benefit of the doubt,
whereas sympathy group relationships will be more susceptible to variation in trust in
response to unfriendly interactions, reflecting a conscious, calculative mode. Of course,
kin relationships may follow a different model, since they seem to show more resilience
to low maintenance (Roberts & Dunbar, in press). Strong ties with non-kin in the inner
circle of around 5 take longer to develop and have to rise to a higher level of trust than
medium or weak ties (i.e., those corresponding to the 50 and 150 outer layers).
Interaction frequencies are one of the most reliable correlates of relationship strength
in both humans and animals (Dunbar & Shultz, 2010; Hays, 1989). For example, Hill and
Dunbar (2003) showed that the level of emotional intimacy in a relationship correlates
with the amount of time invested in it (see also Roberts & Dunbar, in press), and Curry
et al. (2011) have shown that emotional closeness reliably predicts willingness to act
altruistically towards non-kin Alters.
Affective and cognitive correlates of tie strength
Linking the observed regularities of layers with distinct differences in psychological
processes and responses is a task that we are only just starting to tackle. Meeting intimate
friends should produce a measurably more intense emotional response than meeting
just good friends, for example. Yet few studies have assessed emotional response to
meeting friends, either via physiological measures [Galvanic Skin Response (GSR)], heart
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rate, pupilometry: Insel & Fernald, 2004) or via affect questionnaires. The reward for
intimate relationships might be mediated by emotional well-being and endorphin release
(Dunbar, 2010c; Keverne, Martensz, & Tuite, 1989; Machin & Dunbar, in press), but so
far neuropsychologists have not explored this possibility. Similarly, memory schemata
for Alters in strong-tie relationships should be more detailed than those for medium-
tie Alters in terms of intimate details, both about the other person and about their
relationships with third parties. Relationship memory at the sympathy group level may
more typically involve episodic recording of incidents in social history, for example.
Again, these cognitive aspects of relationships have yet to be explored.
As would be expected by the steeper investment in the closest circles of support
clique and sympathy group, stronger ties do tend to be more stable over time (e.g.,
Ledbetter, Griffin, & Sparks, 2007), whereas weaker ties are more liable to change.
In a study of late adolescents, for example, Roberts and Dunbar (in press) found that
only 29.7% of kin Alters (a strong tie) moved from the inner layers (5–15 layers) to the
outer layers (50–150 layers) over an 18-month period, compared to 51.4% of non-kin
(i.e., friend) Alters (representing weaker ties). Stronger ties should also show more
connectivity and centrality within the Ego network, especially within the support
clique where inter-relationships between all the members may be particularly dense and
interconnected (Roberts, 2010). Curry and Dunbar (2011) have shown that, within these
inner network layers, altruism and emotional closeness towards friends is a function of
network density (i.e., the extent to which one’s friends are also friends with each other).
Sympathy group relationships should be more fluid and reflect individuals’ different
interests beyond the cluster; more broadly, relationships will become increasingly
diffuse and less well integrated as one moves out through the layers.
Discussion
We have suggested that patterns in social relationships evolved from simple behavioural
predispositions, such as the tendency for individuals to distribute their social time
budgets unevenly, thereby favouring formation of a small number of intense relationships
while also devoting some of the social time budget to weaker ties. To explain the
observed distributions of relationships at different levels of intensities, we posit that a
set of cost-benefit trade-offs governs the distribution of individuals’ social investment
in others, and that the cost-benefit profile differs for different layers. These trade-offs,
combined with constraints, which may also shape the levels of relationship intensities,
give rise to relationship types that define the support, sympathy, and other levels of
personal social networks. One underlying mechanism that governs the allocation of
social investment in different layers may be the trust formation process, which creates
an ‘affect buffer’ that makes strong ties less susceptible to decay. This affect buffer might
function to free up more social time for Ego to invest in other relationships.
Relationship types or ‘signatures’ (i.e., consistent, recognizable signs in the form of
behaviour) for support and sympathy groups point towards several potential empirical
studies. Dyads of participants with existing relationships, pre-assessed using emotional
closeness scales to assign them to support or sympathy groups, could be tested with
scenario experiments to evaluate hypotheses about different types of support offered
by each network layer. We predict that support group Alters would volunteer more
demanding helpmore rapidly than sympathy group Alters, and these in turnmore rapidly
than Alters in the outer (50 and 150) layers. The quality of memory for Alters and their
activities should also differ between the layers: memory of others in support relationships
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should be more detailed and up to date than those in sympathy relationships, whereas
memory for sympathy group Alters should be more episodic and record critical incidents
in coalitions and social conflicts. Surveys and ethnographic studies could illuminate
how people manage their social time budget in different cultural groups, and test the
hypothesis that the layers should be manifest in individuals’ preferences for spending
more time with a few (the support layer) significant Alters and less time with a larger
number of friends (the sympathy layer), dividing the remainder of their social time
among weak ties. Longitudinal studies on social time budgets may also test the resilience
of different tie strengths to the lack of maintenance or other social stresses. In partial
support of this, we have found that both strong and medium friendship (but not kinship)
ties wane if they are not regularly serviced during the transition from school to university
(Roberts & Dunbar, in press).
A challenge for future studies will be to establish the strength of possible friendship
signatures. The strong version of our signatures hypothesis should bemanifest in discrete
step functions in the distributions of emotional closeness and other friendship measures
(e.g., Oswald et al., 2004); a weaker version of the hypothesis might be satisfied
by triangulation of evidence (i.e., several measures generally point to the distinction
between the support and sympathy layers, although no discrete change is apparent in
any one measure).
The arguments advanced in this paper have been set within an egocentric network
perspective; however, the relationship levels linked to the SBH raise questions as to how
the Ego-level support and sympathy groups are integrated into top-down community-
level network structures. While dense integration in which Ego and their Alters share
support and sympathy friends with each other is possible, empirical evidence suggests
that a more plausible match to actual social structure at the sympathy group level may be
a ‘hub and spokes’ model in which support groups behave as densely connected cliques
and sympathy-level relationships form the bridging spokes between support cliques
(Roberts, 2010). Studies on the structure of social networks, for example, indicate a
pattern of some dense clusters with overall high levels of interconnectivity (Hogan,
2008; Wellman et al., 2006), although data on relationship strength is difficult to equate
with relationship types.
It is currently unclear to what extent network layers reflect group size levels that
are causally based on the functional demands of particular tasks and constrained by the
challenges of group dynamics, or whether they are, in amore explicitly hard-wired sense,
derivative of cognition that was itself an adaptation to task demands in our evolutionary
past. In other words, does human behaviour now fit social and work groups into the
limits set by fundamental cognitive and physical constraints? The influence of computer
technology on social relationships is a useful ecological probe into these conjectures.
Because computer-mediated communication (CMC) such as e-mail, social networking
sites, and texting mitigates the constraints of time and distance, it might be expected
to ameliorate the constraints imposed by social time budgets by making communication
more efficient. Interestingly, the majority of studies to date indicate that the major
function of CMChas been to supplement themaintenance of strong andmedium-strength
relationships formed in the real world. There is scant evidence of any capacity increases
in relationship numbers (Binder, Howes, & Sutcliffe, 2009; Ellison et al., 2007; Lampe,
Ellison, & Steinfield, 2006; Pollett et al., 2011;Wellman, Haase,Witte, & Hampton, 2001).
Social networking sites do afford maintenance of a larger number of weak ties in friends
lists (Donath & Boyd, 2004; Joinson, 2008; Lampe et al., 2006); however, there is little
evidence to suggest that many of these extra relationships are active in the social sense
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of Granovetter’s (1973, 1985) weak ties or the affinity group. If anything, both the online
debate on numbers of friends and surveys of actual friends’ listings on individual sites
strongly conform to the predictions of the social brain model.
One of our motivations in writing this paper was to investigate the convergence
of theory in evolutionary, cognitive, and social psychology. The extension to SBH of
relationship signatures and the trust mechanism leaves open at least three alternative
deep causal explanations. First, relationships and, inter alia, trust formation may reflect
constraints imposed by social cognitive capacities such as theory of mind (Stiller &
Dunbar, 2007) in that memory for managing relationships is limited not only by absolute
capacity but also by accuracy and recency. Trust formation is also limited by a dilution
effect as implied by a generalized Balance Theory (Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Heider,
1946): if Ego spreads attention too thinly, the existing Alters feel betrayed by attention
being devoted to others. A second explanation may be that relationships develop in
different layers for other social motivations, such as the need for belonging and security
during childhood and adolescence, and the capacity to form new deep relationships
becomes exhausted by early adulthood. There is some evidence for this view in
longitudinal studies of friendship (Hays, 1985; Grossetti, 2005), indicating that we form
most strong ties by early adulthood. Third, it may be that our behaviour is at least partially
determined by evolutionary echoes of our past in which selection pressure produced
behavioural predispositions to partition social time budgets in an asymmetrical manner to
favour a few deeper relationships at the expense of many weaker ones. The cost-benefit
trade-offs could link to behaviour that enhances fitness and survival at the individual
level, in the form of improved survival of offspring and parents through reciprocal social
support. Investigating the relative contribution of these mechanisms is a future research
challenge in theory development and will require empirical studies to tease apart
complex interacting influences on human social network evolution and maintenance.
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